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StaticAllocational and
Efficiency Impact on Growth
inprinciple, India's QR-regime, coupled with industrial licensing, could have
diverse effects on the resource allocational system and on the efficiency of
any given activity (e.g., the extent of capacity utilization). We have already
noted many of these in Chapter 2. In this chapter, we supplement that analysis
un two important respects. First, we analyze the impact on the pattern of re-
source utilization among different industries.' Next, we analyze the impact
on capacity utilization within industries.
INEFFICIENCY IN THE PATTERN OF
RESOURCE UTILIZATION
One would expect that an economic regime (as in India) that depends so
critically on direct and detailed regulation of imports and the creation of indus-
trial capacity would exhibit strikingly different social returns on different
activities because the framework of economic policies governing industrializa-
tion does not induce or permit systematic attention to cc'sts, as we have argued
at some length in Chapter 2.
The index we have used to indicate the inter-industrial disparities that
one would expect from our analysis of the economic policies governing trade
and industrialization is the domestic resource cost (DRC) per unit of foreign
exchange. This index is broadly indicative of the differences in the returns to
deployment of domestic resources, using the approximation that observed
anit export values measure true opportunity costs to Society. Aside from the
well-known limitations of this measure, we should note two things:
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1.Wide differentials in DRCs among alternative activities do not neces-
sarily mean commensurate losses to society because reallocation of resources
intended to reduce these differentials may run into sharply increasing costs
and diminishing returns (e.g., international prices would not be the same at
increased levels of exportation). On the other hand, the potential for such
"substitution" in production and trade should not be underestimated in an
economy such as India's.2 And even if one adds up the orders of magnitude
involved in making pairwise, notional reallocations among activities, they
often emerge high enough to indicate that the gains in sizable sectors of indus-
try may be even 30 to 50 percent of the social returns earned from the re-
sources utilized in these sectors.3
2. While we believe that the DRC measure is, in principle, superior to
the effective rate of protection (ERP) measure, particularly insofar as the
analyst is able to take into account shadow prices of domestic inputs and also
marginal rather than average international prices, the DRC estimates we
present for nearly the entire economy for 1963—65 and 1968 are not adjusted
in this way and therefore are rigidly related to the ERP estimates (which we




where V,* is value-added in Indian rupees in the process at international
prices, V, is value-added in Indian rupees in the process at domestic prices
and r is the number of Indian rupees per unit dollar.
Table 13—1 presents the estimates of DRC for 1963—65 for 69 activities,
based on the 77-sector input-output table for The sectors which show
negative value-added at international prices and hence negative numbers
in their DRC estimates indicate that (on current techniques) these activities
cause losses to the economy. The remaining activities show again a wide
variation in their DRC estimates.5
Table 13—1 also presents DRC estimates for the same sixty-nine sectors
for 1968—69, thus defining a comparable set of DRCs before and after the
1966 policy changes. Presumably because of the short-run period since 1966,
the differentials in DRCs among the different activities continue in 1968 to
be as large [if one takes the comparison of values in row (i) in Table 13—4
as one should, because the heavy impact of extreme values reflected in row
(ii)is really misleading].° There is nonetheless a slight fall in the standard



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































level and variations in import premia did fall significantly during the period
between mid-1966 and 1968—69 owing to import liberalization and the reces-
Sian (as indicated earlier in this volume), so that• the extremes in the DRC
results of 1963—65 are not so evident in the DRC results of Note
also that (as is evident from Table 13—4), the average DRC (when we com-
pare rows (ii)again) rose only slightly between 1963—65 and 1968—69
despite the shift in the exchange rate from Rs. 4.75 to Rs. 7.50 per dollar.
This is, however, attributable to the fact that value-added, while going up in
domestic prices, increased significantly at international prices: implicit tariffs
had fallen, in general, more sharply for outputs than for inputs in 1968—69
compared with 1963—65, the fall in import premia thus exhibiting a negative
escalation with respect to processing. The latter phenomenon may well have
to be explained by reference to the recession which led to serious pressures
on domestic output prices and on continuing import controls, despite import
liberalization, which implied not so serious pressure on domestic input prices.
We also include for 1968—69 an estimate of ERPs in Column (6) of
Table 13_1.8 As is to be expected, these also show great differentials among
the different activities.9 It is also interesting to note that, for most of the activi-
ties, the implicit (nominal) tariffs in Column (5) are below the effective
tariffs.
Table 13—2 gives the simple and weighted average estimates of ERPs
and DRCs for 1968—69, grouped by the following major categories: (1) con-
sumer goods, (2) intermediate goods (primary), (3) intermediate goods
(semi-finished and finished) and (4) capital goods. Within each of these
major groups, we have further distinguished among different subgroups with
different interactions with international trade, essentially separating the agro-
based industries from the others in each group. The weighted average rates
have been derived by using the value-added at international prices as the
weights.
The ERPs for primary consumer goods are the lowest, and those for the
non-food consumer goods are the highest. Agro-based intermediate goods of
semi-finished/finished type receive much higher effective protection than the
other intermediate goods. Capital goods receive lower effective protection
than intermediate goods (except the agro-based primary type) and consumer
goods (except the primary type). The domestic resource cost is 8.38 for
primary goods; 19.93 for non-food, semi-finished and finished consumer
goods; 18.21 for agro-based, semi-finished and finished intermediate goods;
and 13.36 for capital foods. The rather steep protection of the(non-
primary) consumer goods and (to a lesser extent) of certain intermediates
and many capital goods, which appear to have been among the major bene-
ficiaries of the industrialization process, and their attendant high domestic
resource cost, would appear to conform to the notions one has from more
casual knowledge of the economy and the planning strategy.STATIC ALLOCATIONAL AND EFFICIENCY IMPACT ON GROWTH 183
The DRC estimates given above are necessarily approximate, particularly
in relying on market premium rates which can be very unreliable and which
had to be applied to a large range of industries, and :in having to cope with
literally thousands of items at a highly aggregated level in such calculations.
They are nonetheless adequate for pointing out the high coefficient of varia-
tion in the returns on different activities.
It is useful, however, to know that even detailed estimates for the auto-
mobile ancillary industry, based on personal interviews and data collection,
corroborate these conclusions in "microcosm." Thus, in Table 13—3, we have
Anne Krueger's estimated thirty-four DRCs for products/firms. Taking only
the positive DRCs into account, they range from 7.87 to
It seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude that in ignoring costs—an
indifference amply documented by an analysis of the actual allocational poli-
cies toward import and industrial licensing—the economic policies of the
government have not merely made it likely that the resulting allocations would
be inefficient but have, in actuality, led to such an outcome. We should point
out that we would be rather more skeptical in reaching this conclusion if we
merely had available to us the statistical results on the variance in the DRCs
among activities, for it is arguable that the data base of these estimates is not
so firm as one would wish. Thus, even in an economy in which the government
paid attention to costs and refrained from massive intervention in resource
allocation, one could well find, on taking a cross-section measurement of
DRCs, a fairly wide spread and variance among them because the economy
would be in a perpetual state of disequilibrium and flux resulting from factors
such as changing international prices, technologies, availability of information,
and so on. But our inference that the wide variance observed does indicate
that the system is sub-optimally organized is considerably reinforced by our
detailed observation (see Chapter 2) that the system is indeed designed to
ignore opportunity costs in making allocational decisions. It is therefore the
con junction of this rather institutional but extremely vital evidence on the
method of allocation of imports and licensed capacities, with the observed
pattern of DRC spread among different activities, that makes our inference of




Indian manufacturing has been characterized by great excess capacity in a
number of industries. The official data on capacity utilization are quite hope-
less in that they compound inevitable conceptual difficulties with several

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Price Ratios and Domestic Resource Costs





(rupees per dollar) ForeignPrice
(1) (2) (3)
Assembler 1 137 8.25
Assembler 2 139 8.62
Assembler 3 125 7.87
Assembler 4 197 34.95
Assembler 5 140 10.91*
Assembler 6 118 8.85
Metal fabricator 1 128 19.95
Metal fabricator 2 236 27.80
Metal fabricator 3a 161 83.92
Metal fabricator 3b 149 17.85
Metal fabricator 4 260 negative
Metal fabricator 5 175 14.62
Metal fabricator 6 137 9.45
Metal fabricator 7 180 26.47
Metal fabricator 8a 180 11.17*
Metal fabricator 8b 181 20.41*
Metal fabricator 9a 167 20.10*
Metal fabricator 9b 167 8.67*
Metal fabricator 9c 167 2 1.45*
Chemical la 227 17.47
Chemical lb 202 11.55*
Chemical2 133 10.95*
Chemical 3 33.75
Chemical 4a 244 33.15*
Chemical 4b 309 negative
Chemical 4c 278 184.27
ChemicalS 175 12.07
Chemical6 286 180.60**
Miscellaneous product la 192 4447*
Miscellaneous product lb 158 12.81
Miscellaneous product 2 183 17.53*
Miscellaneous product 3 156 18.15
Miscellaneous product 4 167 17.25
Miscellaneous product 5 262 49.05*
NOTE: All price data are based on ex-factory domestic price and Indian f.o.b. export
price except where denoted by an asterisk. One asterisk indicates that the relevant foreign
price is the United Kingdom ex-factory price; two asterisks indicate that the foreign price
employed is a c.i.f. Bombay price.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DGTD, which compiles the data, also regulates AU allocations and therefore
the capacity estimates have tended to lie anywhere within the range defined by
entrepreneurs who wish to exaggerate capacity in order to get more AU
licenses, and by DGTD officials who will refuse to "recognize" capacity aug-
mentation because this would increase their apparent obligation to provide
AU licenses.13
We have therefore refrained from including here any analysis based on
the statistical tables containing these unreliable, and almost meaningless, esti-
mates of excess capacity in India. On the other hand, we note that interviews,
chairmen's annual reports to their companies and studies of individual firms
and industries uniformly indicate that the incidence of under-utilization of
capacity has been particularly severe in the "new" industries, i.e., in engineer-
ing goods and chemicals, both of which have depended significantly on imports
of materials for their production.'4 And we also include one set of recent esti-
mates of under-utilized industrial capacity for 1961 to 1964 for selected indus-
tries, in Table
Under-utilization of capacity, even in the import-intensive industries,
cannot be charged entirely to the QR-regime and to licensing policies although,
as we argue below, they do have important effects in that direction. Labor
problems resulting in strikes and lockouts, electricity breakdowns and inter-
ruptions in transportation are generally held to have accounted for consider-
able under-utilization.
In addition, the ready availability of project as against maintenance aid
in the pre-1966 period of India's industrialization is generally believed to have
resulted in the creation of more capacity (to use up project aid) in the face of
existing excess capacity. However, this hardly seems plausible. One finds it
difficult to understand why firms should want to add to capacity, or why new
firms should seek to enter an industry already troubled by excess capacity,
just because they can import the necessary capital goods. It is rather the OR-
(and industrial licensing) regime that appears to have led to the utilization of
available project aid in areas where capacity utilization was already inade-
quate. Let us turn now to the arguments linking the OR-regime to excess
capacity.
1. The tendency to relate equity in the allocation of AU licenses to in-
stalled capacity led to an incentive to create capacity by linking the availability
of premia-fetching imports with creation of more capacity. Thus, as Bhagwati
and Desai have argued, an entrepreneur, with a given capacity that was under-
utilized for lack of imported inputs, could not (under the Indian OR-regime)
expand output through additional utilization of capacity.16 The only way he
could increase production was by getting more capacity installed and having
some import quota allotted to him on the basis of it. But even if the entrepre-
neur were allowed access to more imports at market prices'7 so that he couldSTATiC ALLOCATIONAL AND EFFICIENCY IMPACT ON GROWTH 189
TABLE 13-5















Tobacco productsa 10.6 4.4 5.2 12.7 8.2
Textile products
















Paper and paper productsb11.2 10.5 7.8 11.7 10.3
Leather and leather 59.9 57.8 54.4 56.0 57.0
products (27.6) (24.4) (17.9) (21.5) (22.8)
Rubber and rubber 16.1 23.1 25.6 26.7 22.9
products (5.7) (7.1) (11.2) (10.6) (8.7)
Chemicals and 53.5 56.8 59.3 55.3 56.2
chemical products (29.0) (23.9) (21.2) (30.0) (26.0)
Non-metallic— 36.2 34.7 33.0 35.3 34.8




























tricalmachines (12.7) (11.4) (7.3) (21.1) (13.1)
Electrical machinery 39.7 43.6 45.4 41.8 42.6
andappliances (8.3) (11.7) (11.7) (10.6) (8.1)
Transport equipment 49.3 42.2 41.8 35.7 42.4
(22.5) (18.2) (16.3) (10.7) (16.9)
NOTE: This table is based on both present and desirable working conditions. Figures
in parentheses aieforpresent working conditions.
SOURCE: Underuti!isation of Industrial Capacity (New Delhi: National Council of
Applied Economic Research, 1966), Table 2.
a.For present working conditions, these industries show overutilization.
b. The number of shifts working at present and the number considered desirable are
thesame for industries of this group.
expandutilization of existing capacity, he would have to purchase inputs at
import-premia-inclusive market prices, whereas expansion of capacity would
enable him to expand output by access to premia-exciusive import allocations.
This would then certainly bias, ceteris paribus, his choice between these two
courses of action toward creating more capacity.190 GROWTH EFFECTS
Furthermore, the artificial cheapening of CG imports under an over-
valued exchange rate system based on direct allocations could lead to sub-
optimally increased capital intensity in relation to the primary factor, labor.
Even more important in practice than these two arguments is the fact
that (for most industries, until 1966 at least) licensing constrained the crea-
tion of capacity and QR policy guaranteed domestic sales at high enough
prices to let licensed firms make large profits even at low levels of capacity
utilization. Thus, even when there was excess capacity, it would pay a new
firm to enter an industry, provided it could get the license to do so, then get
its pro-rata-to-capacity share of scarce AU imports, and still earn a large
profit. On the other hand, with free entry and competition for imported mate-
rials in the market, such a venture would have been untenable.
2. In addition to the consequences of licensing intermediates and capital
goods in this fashion, there was another mechanism that accentuated excess
capacity in the system via import licensing. In an economic regime where
efficient firms can bid intermediates away from the inefficient, the former will
achieve greater utilization of their capacity whereas the latter will be forced
out. This process, which is also efficient because not all capacity is desirable
and the undesirable must be scrapped to avoid larger losses, necessarily leads
to higher overall rates of capacity utilization than in the current, Indian-type
regime where inefficient firms automatically get "squatters' rights" to AU
allocations.18
3. Another way i.n which the OR-regime must have affected capacity
utilization was the bottlenecks it created. Undoubtedly, bottlenecks would arise
in any regime; but the ability to correct them was severely constrained, for
a number of firms, by the difficulty of effecting remedial imports. There is
substantial evidence of this phenomenon in the Redbooks on Import Policy
where occasional notices of special dispensation can be found in cases where
action was finally taken to ease a particularly glaring bottleneck. Interviews
with industrialists have confirmed this picture.19 These bottlenecks add to
excess capacity in two ways: (1) by preventing speedy availability of inputs
into a process, and (2) by holding up the importation of critical spares and
balancing equipment which would enable the existing capacity to be exploited
more effectively. The former set of bottlenecks came from the restrictions built
into the AU licensing system; the latter related to both CG and industrial
licensing procedures.
4. Yet another way in which the import-control regime in India affected
capacity utilization was by inhibiting the utilization •of excess capacity for
export markets. While, as we have argued in Chapters 8 and 9, there is evi-
dence that firms with substantial excess capacity did manage to improve capac-
ity utilization through exports after the June 1966 liberalization policy changes,
we also note there that the export effort was badly compromised by the inabil-STATIC ALLOCATIONAL AND EFFICIENCY IMPACT ON GROWTH 191
ityofthe firms to exploit the intended liberalization of imports meaningfully.
The liberalization permitted the firms to renew their "normal" AU quotas only
afterevidenceof substantial utilization of the initial AU license. This resulted
in a substantial lag in the utilization of the augmented foreign credits for
maintenance imports and prevented quicker export sales. The severe restric-
tions on transfers of licenses and on permissible imports also continued, pre-
venting quick adjustments in production and capacity to respond to interna-
tional orders. In effect, the substantial inflexibility of the import control regime
has made it difficult for firms, when presented with export opportunities to
reduce capacity under-utilization at low marginal costs, to exploit these oppor-
tunities. If we are to reckon on the full impact on capacity utilization from
this cause, we should take the primary effect just discussed and add to it the
secondary effect which is implied by the fact that additional export earnings
would ease the import situation and make more maintenance imports available
for further capacity utilization.
It is not possible to quantify meaningfully and accurately the extent of
production and value-added lost to society by the effects of the (trade and
industrial) direct-allocational regime, arising from the kinds of mechanisms
that we have analyzed. Since, however, there islittle reason otherwise to
expect serious under-utilization to have emerged and persisted (except for
reasons such as strikes, electricity breakdowns and the post-1966 recession)
in sectors such as engineering goods where the phenomenon has been acute
for a long time, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that their production
would have increased significantly under .a different economic regime.2°
OVERALL EFFECTS
It would thus seem reasonable to conclude that the foreign trade regime led
to a wasteful misallocation of investible resources among alternative industries
and also accentuated the under-utilization of investments within these indus-
tries. If we also recall from Chapter 2 that the regime greatly reduced the
degree of competition to which the firms in these industries were subject, and
thus practically eliminated the incentives that such competition normally pro-
for reducing costs, the regime can be regarded as being wasteful in a
threefold fashion. Needless to say, when we also add to these inefficiencies the
several other adverse effects which we discussed in Chapter 2, there is little
doubt that returns on Indian investments must have been substantially reduced
by the regime. Hence, we would be justified in saying that the analysis in this
Chapter and in Chapter 2 shows rather persuasively that, by reducing the
productivity of investment, India's foreign trade regime adversely influenced
the economy's growth performance as well.Appendix:
Sources and Methods
1.For the DRC and ERP estimates in Tables 13—1 and 13—2, for
1963—65 and 1968—69, we have used the 1964—65 input-output table (at
1960—61 prices) prepared by M. R. Saluja and published in Sankhya, 1968.
For the 1968—69 estimates, the sectoral price indices for 1968—69 (with 1965
as the base) are derived from the volumes of "Wholesale Prices in India" and
these are used to convert the input and output values in 1965 prices into those
in 1968—69 prices. The implicit tariffs for 1968—69 are derived from various
sources: for some sectors, the method of direct price comparison is adopted,
whereas for some others the data on premium rates on import licenses and
the nominal tariff rates are used to derive the implicit tariffs. The ratio of
domestic price to international price is given by (1 + implicit tariff rate).
These ratios are used to derive the input-values and output-values, and hence
the value-added, in international prices. The ERPestimatesare thus based on
these implicit tariffs.
2. For the analysis of 1963—65, the input-output coefficients of the
1964—65 table are used. The ratios of the domestic price to international
price, for the period 1963—65, are derived from the following sources: (1)
The unit values (producer's prices) are computed from the ASI Volumes of
1963 and 1965; (2) the corresponding c.i.f. unit values are obtained from
trade data in several sectors whereas, in others (3) we have used market-
interviews-based average premium rates during 1963—65 and price compari-
Sons from various other sources and studies. Note that while the used are
the average for 1963, 1964 and 1965, based on ASI information, in nearly all
industries, the premium rates used to derive the international prices are taken
anywhere from the period 1963 to 1965, as available.
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3. The precise methodology consists in starting with the 1964—65 input-
output table (at 1960—61 prices). In the first instance has been upgraded
to 1968—69 prices by using sectoral price indices for 1968—69 with 1960—61
as the base. These price indices are derived from the wholesale price index
numbers published by commodity groups. Care is taken in building up cor-
respondence between sectoral classification and the commodity groups of the
price indices. In fact, price indices for the financial year are derived by using
detailed monthly price statistics as published price indices refer to calendar
years. However, it cannot be denied that correspondence between sectors and
commodity groups may not be perfect and some imputations have been inevi-
table. Sectoral indices have been built by using the weights of the commodity
groups as given in the published sources.
4. To the data thus derived in 1968—69 prices, ratios have been applied
to get the values in international prices. These price-ratios for 1968—69, and
1963—65 are separately derived, from several sources. Those for 1963—65
aie, for example, based on (1) published premium data (Vyapar), (2) tariff
rates and (3) direct price comparisons (from ASI and trade statistics), etc.
Since these are averages of 2 to 3 years of 1963—65, the results are described
as 1963—65 results. The price-ratios of 1963—65 are applied directly to the
original input and output values of the 1964—65 input-output table, i.e., the
values in 1960—61 prices. Hence the estimates of 1963—65 are all in 1960—61
prices, though they are derived from 1963—65 price-ratios of domestic to
international prices.
5. In deriving DRCs, value-added inclusive of non-traded inputs (rail-
ways, electricity and margin) is computed as the domestic resources. The
official exchange rate used for 1968—69 is Rs. 7.50 per dollar and that used
for 1963—65 is Rs. 4.75 per dollar.
6. In assessing the extreme variations in the DRC estimates in Tables
13—1 to 13—3, the reader must bear in mind the fact of variations in premia:
these have to be personally observed to be readily believed. Also, in noting
the rather dramatic shifts in DRCs between 1963—65 and 1968—69 in Table
13—1, for identical industries, remember that these can arise frbm changes in
(1) the relative domestic prices of inputs and outputs, (2) the ratio of domes-
tic to international prices of inputs and of outputs and (:3) the exchange rate.
These factors, for example, account for the drastic increase in DRC for gur
and khandsari (sugar) from a negative figure in 1963—65 to the large figure
of 259.2 in 1968—69. In particular, the exchange rate had increased from
4.75 to 7.50 and the ratio of domestic to international prices had fallen from
2.80 to 1.89 for one input while rising for the output in this industry, account-
ing for the dramatic shift in its DRC. For details on each industry's DRC
calculation, refer to Dr. V. R. Panchamukhi, Reader in Econometrics, Uni-
versity of Bombay, Bombay, India.194 GROWTH EFFECTS
7. It may be contended that, in reality, our DRC estimates are ERP
estimates rather than (shadow-price-adjusted) DRC estimates. On the other
hand, note two points. (1) An appropriate methodology is necessary to derive
shadow prices of capital, labor, etc. Thus, any adjustment of prices
by numbers which are asserted to be shadow prices is little more than "sensi-
tivity analysis" and does not really elevate the resulting DRC estimates to a
greater claim of legitimacy. Nor can one claim, for example, that pushing
up interest rates from lows of 3—4percentannually to 10—15 percent must
necessarily be good as it is a move in the "right direction": the theory of
second-best does not validate the claim that a move in the direction of the
optimal solution is welfare-improving. To put it another way, nearly all the
DRCs, adjusted for so-called shadow prices, suffer in practice from very much
the same defects (as regards their worth as measures of social returns) as
ERPs. For a detailed critique of the two concepts, and their relationship to
more sophisticated cost-benefit analysis, see I. M. D. Little and James Mirrlees,
Project Appraisal and Planning for Developing Countries, Heinemann Edu-
cational Books: London, 1974, especially Chapter 18, pp. 363—366. Thus
our stress in the text that the ERP/DRC estimates in this chapter are only
"broadly" indicative of the differential returns from different activities, thanks
to India's QR-regime, has a sound basis. (2) Further, while the text emphasizes
only the "returns" aspect of these estimates, it may occur to the reader to in-
terpret the ERP estimates as showing, in the usual manner, the "resource-allo-
cational" or "pull" effects (among different activities) of the tariff structure
so measured. This is not so, however, and not merely for the theoretical rea-
sons spelled out in recent contributions to the general equilibrium theory of
effective protection and resource allocation (e.g., see the Symposium on this
topic in the Journal of International Economics, May 1973, with particular
reference to the contributions by Bruno, Bhagwati and Srinivasan, and Khang).
Among the other reasons, we may particularly mention that, in a OR-regime
where producers have access to part of their imported inputs via AU licenses
and part via the market, and the former access implies getting imports at
premium-exclusive prices while the latter implies getting them at premium-
inclusive prices, the calculation of ERPs from an incentive viewpoint should
also take into account this differential effect on input protection. In the esti-
mates of ERPs in Bhagwati and Desai, op. cit., calculated again by Dr. V. R.
Panchamukhi, this distinction was indeed taken into account, using estimates
of the fraction of imported-inputs requirements which were met by AU li-
censes in each activity. This has not been done in the ERP estimates in the text
here because the focus there is not on the incentive effects but rather on the
cost-benefit interpretation of the DRC variety.
Hence, if we wished to get our ERP estimates closer to the "true"
incentive-oriented measure, we would have to adjust them for the direct accessAPPENDiX: SOURCES AND METHODS 195
to imports under AU licenses. And, if we wished to get our DRC estimates
closer to the "true" cost-benefit-oriented measure, we would need to compute
systematically a set of appropriate shadow prices—a major analytical and em-
pirical enterprise in itself—and utilize these instead of the actual market prices.
NOTES
1. This work was carried out entirely, and with great care and skill, by Dr. V. R.
Panchamukhi of Bombay University, India. He has co-authored this chapter.
2. Thus for example, Asit Banerjee, in a forthcoming paper in Sankhya (1974), has
estimated the elasticity of substitution for cotton textiles, jute textiles, sugar, paper and
the bicycle industries, indicating that this may well be close to unil:y (if we use the SMAC
method of estimation) for all except paper.
3. This is clearly evident from Anne Krueger's recent, detailed study of the auto
ancillary industry in India where, utilizing data gathered at the firm level, she has shown
differences in DRCs among different activities of over 100 percent. Clearly, instead of
permitting indiscriminate growth of nearly all ancillaries, by furnishing automatic pro-
tection to them, if the structure and degree of protection had been devised rationally, the
net result could have been more social returns from the same resource utilization. See
Krueger, The Benefits and Costs of import Substitution in India: A Microcconomic Study,
USAID, October 1970.
4. The methodology by which DRCs were calculated is the standard one and is
therefore not spelled out here. However, see the Appendix at the end of the chapter for
important details.
5. The coefficients of variation are included in Table 13—4.
6. The coefficients of variation are still high (though lower than in 1968—69) and
are included in Table 13—4.
7. The enormous variations in import premia can resultin "implausible" DRCs,
given our methodology of computing DRCs by deducting the international value-added
from domestic value-added. Thus, for example, for animal husbandry, in 1968—69, the
implicit tariff rate for output was 125 percent and significantly larger than for the major
inputs (where it was in the range of 50 to 80 percent). The net result was to make
value-added negative at international prices during 1968—69. However, in 1963—65, the
implicit tariff rate (determined by the import premium) was smaller on output than on
the inputs, resulting in positive value-added at international prices. In this connection, it
may be noted that very large variations in DRCs have been calculated also by Krueger,
op. cit., within the auto ancillary industry, even though international value-added was
estimated by direct inquiries on c.i.f. and f.o.b. prices of inputs and outputs.
8. The DRCs are related to the ERP estimates as noted earlier in this chapter. Note
also that our calculations of ERPs treat non-traded goods as part of value-added—the
so-called Corden method.
9. The coefficients of variation are included in Table 13—4.
10. For negative value-added industries, the value-added in domestic prices is used
as the weight because the ERP index is then calculated with the value-added in domestic
prices in the denominator, when the formula is written as the incremental value-added
divided by value-added at domestic prices.
11. The coefficient of variation is included in Table 13—4.
12. The conceptual and statistical difficulties surrounding the capacity statistics in196 GROWTHEFFECTS
India have been discussed in numerous sources. See J. Bhagwati, "The Measurement of
Excess Capacity," IS! Working Paper, 1962; and Nancy Slocum, Underutilized Industrial
Capacity in India: Exploration of Measures and Causes, USAID, New Delhi, 1970.
13. Cf. Frankena,op.cit., and Slocum, op. cit., in particular.
14. The DGTD data on capacity utilization are also consistent with this picture.
15. These estimates are largely based on the official estimates but have been
adjusted slightly. Also, estimates are based on "desirable" working conditions; i.e., using
multiple-shift assumptions.
16. Op cit., pp. 326.-327.
17. This could happen through illegal purchases in the black market. It also became
possible when the import entitlements, under the Export Promotion schemes, were made
legally transferable since 1965.
18. In the paints and varnishes industry, reviewed in detail by Nancy Slocum, it is
clear that the governmental allocational policies have enabled a number of units to
survive, while excess capacity and shortage of materials persist. In fact, she even refers to
"the black market sales which many of the small units engage in in lieu of production"
(p.57, op. cit.). This is known to have been a phenomenon prevalent in several
industries.
19. Aside from interviews by us, the study by V. K. Ramaswami and D. G. Pfoutz,
Utilization of industrial Capacity, 1965, conducted jointly by the Ministr.y of Finance
and USAID, confirmed the existence of serious bottlenecks in the system. The continua-
tion of such difficulties as late as 1970 was confirmed by Nancy Slocum, in her Under-
utilized Industrial Capacity in India: Exploration of Measures and Causes, a study
commissioned by USAID.
20. Cf. Nancy Slocum, op. cit., on the railway wagons industry in particular.